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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is an appeal from a final judgment of Third Judicial District Court, the
Honorable Judge Su Chon presiding, and a supplemental memorandum decision
viJ

awarding Defendants' costs, including mediation costs. The Utah Supreme Court
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. Section 78A-3-102. The case was
transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals and
jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78A-4103(2)G). The final judgment is attached hereto as Appendix A and the
supplemental Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Appendix B.
RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The following relevant statutes and rules are set forth in full at Appendix
D:

(1)

Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-l0a-702, 16-l0a-807, 16-l0a-808, 16-l0a-809
and 16-l0a-1608

(2)

Utah Rule of Evidence 803

(3)

Utah Rule of Evidence 801

(4)

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 14

(5)

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

This case involves a dispute over ownership of an Asian market, Southeast
Supermarket ("the Company"), located in Salt Lake City.
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The Plaintiffs are

siblings Weiman Ha ("Wein:an"), Muoi Ha ("Muoi"), and Olivia Ha ("Olivia")
(colle_ctively, "Plaintiffs"), who claimed to hold the majority of shares in the
market and therefore are entitled to call a shareholders' meeting to take over the
market's operations. The Defendants are Cuong Si Trang (''Cuong"), who is
President of the market, and Sylvia Trang ("Sylvia"), Cuong' s daughter and
Secretary of the market. The Company was also named as a Defendant. (Cuong
and Sylvia are collectively referred to as the "Trangs", and the Trangs and the
Company are collectively referred to as "Defendants"). Cuong is married to
Plaintiffs' sister, Pamela Trang ("Pamela") so this is also a family dispute.
After a seven-day jury trial, the trial court correctly found that Plaintiffs
were not the majority shareholders of Southeast Supermarket. The trial court
found the ownership to be as follows: of the 125,700 currently issued and
outstanding shares, Cuong owns 65,000 (51.71 %), Muoi owns 40,000 (31.82% ),
Weiman owns 15,700 (12.49%), and Olivia owns 5,000 (3.97%).

Lavinia Ha

("Lavinia"), another Ha sibling, was found to have previously owned 20,000
shares, but to have sold all her shares back to the Company in July 2013.
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, the trial court's findings are amply
supported by the evidence. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently
marshal the evidence such that reversal of the trial court is warranted. There was
sufficient evidence to support the trial court's factual findings regarding the
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number and distribution of shares. The trial court's credibility determinations
were not clearly erroneous. In addition, Plaintiffs' claims of inconsistent
testimony by the Trangs are flawed and do not require reversal on appeal.
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court should be reversed because it
incorrectly relied on hearsay evidence in its Findings of Fact. These arguments
·~

are flawed for several reasons.

First, Plaintiffs overlook that most of this

evidence was properly admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule, namely,
the business records exception. Second, in some instances, Plaintiffs did not
object to the purported hearsay testimony, and thus they did not preserve their
arguments for appeal.

Finally, the evidence Plaintiffs assert was incorrectly

admitted and relied on by the trial court was not in fact hearsay because it was
not offered or considered for the truth of the matter asserted.
Plaintiffs further contend that because Lavinia was not a party to the case,
the trial court erred by allowing Defendants to offer evidence of her interests.
Yet throughout this case, Defendants have asserted that Lavinia owned shares in
the Company; notably, Plaintiffs never objected to this assertion and did not
suggest she needed to be added as a party until halfway through trial. Contrary
to Plaintiffs' assertions, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 14 is inapplicable to this
case because there is no claim for liability that the Defendants could seek to pass
on to Lavinia.
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In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by concluding that
their demand for a shareholders' meeting did not meet the statutory
requirements. Because the demand was signed by their attorney, rather than
them as shareholders, contrary to the express requirements of Utah Code Ann.
Section 16-l0a-702, the trial court did not err in reaching this conclusion.
Alternatively, any error was harmless because the trial court in fact ordered a
shareholders' meeting in its final judgment.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by awarding the Trangs
mediation costs in the amount of $1,072.50. In making the award, the trial court
correctly noted that Plaintiffs never objected to the Trangs' request for mediation
costs; therefore, this issue was not preserved for appeal. Alternatively, even if
preserved, it was within the trial court's sound discretion to award these costs.
The trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and
Judgment attached hereto as Appendix A should be affirmed in its entirety.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

In 1997, Cuong quit his job as a mechanical engineer and become the

proprietor of an Asian food market known as "Tay Do." (R. 1538 at 123-124).

2.

Cuong acquired the market from Long Xa using his own personal

funds and additional money that he borrowed from his uncle. (Id. at 124).
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3.

Cuong renamed the market "New Tay Do" and operated the market

as a sole proprietorship. (Id. at 124-125).
4.

When the market was acquired in 1997, Weiman lived and worked

in New York, Muoi lived in Canada, and Olivia lived in Canada. (R. 1537 at 38,
77-78; R. 1538 at 12-13, 47, 127-130; R. 1540 at 50).
5.

Over the course of the next two years, Weiman and Muoi moved to

Salt Lake City and went to work for the market. 1 (R. 1538 at 127-129).
6.

During this period of time, Muoi and Olivia contributed some

money to the operation of the market. (Id. at 133-134).

7.

Although Weiman claims to have contributed funds to the operation

of the market, no evidence supported this claim other than his own self-serving
testimony, and he could not articulate a specific date the money was provided or
an amount that was given. (R. 1540 at 84-87; see also R. 1538 at 134-135 (Weiman
contributed no money)).
8.

By 1999, Cuong decided to incorporate the market. (R. 1538 at 135).

9.

Cuong discussed the idea with Weiman, Muoi and Olivia and with

his other sister-in-law, Lavinia. (Id. at 138).

1

Olivia travelled to Utah and assisted in the market on occasion, but did not
move back to Salt Lake City until 2001. (R. 1537 at 46; R. 1538 at 15, 19, 48, 130,
132-133; R. 1540 at 50).
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10.

Weiman' s grown daughter, Ellen Ha Nicoletti ("Ellen"), an

accountant then living in California, assisted in forming the corporate entity.
Ellen assisted in the preparation of, among other things, Articles of Incorporation
and Corporate Bylaws for the Company.

Ellen also assisted Cuong in

terminating the business name ,.,New Tay Do." (R. 1538 at 110-112, 137-139; R.
1539 at 6-14). 2
11.

The Con1pany was officially formed on March 24, 1999. (Ex. P2).

12.

The Articles of Incorporation for the Company, prepared by Ellen,

identify both Cuong and Weiman as directors of the Company. (Id. at Art. VI).
13.

Both Cuong and Weiman were aware of their assigned role as

Directors of the C01npany, and both agreed to serve in that capacity. (R. 1538 at
139; R. 1540 at 54, 105).
14.

The Articles of Incorporation for the Company authorize the

issuance of 145,700 shares of stock. (Ex. P2 at Art. III).
15.

On or before March 23, 1999, it was determined that shares in the

Company would be issued as follows: Cuong: 65,000; Muoi: 40,000; Lavinia Ha
("Lavinia"): 35,700; Olivia: 5,000. (R. 1539 at 34-36; Ex. DS).

2

Although Weiman denied Ellen's involvement, dismissing her as a "girl", Muoi
and Olivia testified that they did not know whether she was involved or not. (R.
1537 at 87).

6
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16.

Cuong, Muoi, Lavinia and Olivia were the four originally identified

shareholders for the Company. (R. 1539 at 34).
17.

Lavinia later determined, however, that she wanted some of her

anticipated shares, 15,700, to be issued to her brother, Weiman, instead. It was
therefore agreed that the shares of the Company would be issued as follows:
Cuong Trang: 65,000; Muoi Ha: 40,000; Lavinia Ha: 20,000; Weiman Ha: 15,700;
Olivia Ha: 5,000. (Id. at 35-37).
18.

Effective March 23, 1999, Lavinia, who lived and worked in

California, executed a Revocable Proxy authorizing her brother, Weiman, to vote
her shares in the Company in her absence. (Ex. D6).
19.

The Revocable Proxy document was prepared by Ellen using the

Trangs' home computer. Lavinia, who lived in California, signed the document
and mailed it to Cuong. (R. 1541 at 126-129).
20.

Weiman, Muoi and Olivia each worked as employees of the

Company. (R. 1538 at 127, 129, 131).
21.

Weiman had general responsibility for the financial affairs of the

Company, had access to and signature authority on the Company's bank
accounts, and was responsible for the Company's tax filings, including sales and
income tax filings. (R. 1537 at 44-45; R. 1538 at 128; R. 1539 at 51; R. 1540 at 56,
82-83, 155).
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22.

Muoi and Olivia worked as sales clerks. Muoi also assisted in the

ordering of inventory, and Olivia helped stock the shelves. (R. 1538 at 129, 131).
23.

Cuong worked long hours to ensure the Company's continued

growth and success. (R. 1538 at 125-126).
24.

Cuong frequently called upon his children to help at the market and

to ensure that all of the work could be done. (R. 1538 at 126-127; R. 1539 at 53,
121-122).
25.

In 2004, it was discovered that ·weiman had been writing checks on

the Company accounts in order to pay for rent for the separate restaurant, South
China House, which he had opened next door, to pay for equipment and
upgrades for the restaurant, and to pay for personal expenses, including medical
expenses associated with a stroke. (R. 1539 at 40-42; R. 1540 at 133-153; R. 1541 at
~

42-43).
26.

As a result of this discovery, Cuong removed Weiman as Director

and revoked his authority to write checks on the Company's accounts. (R. 1539
at 41; R. 1541 at 42-43;; R. 1542 at 91-95; Ex. D8).
27.

Letters regarding Cuong' s removal as a Director were mailed to

Weiman, Muoi, Olivia and Lavinia. (R. 1539 at44-47; Exs. D9 & D10).
28.

Cuong also discussed Weiman's removal as a Director with Lavinia.

(R. 1539 at 48).
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29.

Around this same time, Lavinia signed a document revoking the

proxy she had previously given to Weiman to vote her shares in the Company.

(R. 1539 at 48-49; R. 1541 at 131-132; Ex. D11).
30.

The proxy revocation document was prepared by Sylvia using the

Trangs' home computer and mailed to Lavinia in California. Cuong received a
~

copy of the document, signed by Lavinia, in the mail. (R. 1539 at 48; R. 1541 at
131-133).
31.

In 2007, it was determined that Muoi was taking money and/or

inventory from the Company. As a result of this discovery, Muoi's employment
with the company was terminated. (R. 1539 at 53-54; R. 1541 at 86; see also R. 1541
at 86-101 & D31 (surveillance video clips and related testimony evidencing
Muoi' s theft cash register)).
32.

On November 14, 2009, Sylvia officially became the Secretary and

Treasurer of the Company but began to perform secretarial functions for the
~

Company as early as 2008.

Cuong continued to serve as the Company's

President and CEO. (R. 1541 at 15-16; D24).
33.

On February 26, 2010, Weiman Ha sent a letter to the Company,

Attn: Cuong, demanding that a special shareholders meeting be held on March
12, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. at the corporate offices of the Company (the "February 2010
Demand"). This meeting was never held. (R. 1539 at 63-64; Ex. Pll).
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34.

On April 18, 2010, a meeting was held between Lavinia, Weiman,

Olivia and Cuong at Weiman's restaurant, the purpose of which was to discuss
and resolve disputes over the ownership of the market, including obtaining a
valuation of the store. (R. 1538 at 102-103; R. 1540 at 189-191).
35.

This meeting was set up by Lavinia. (R. 1539 at 74-74).

36.

Muoi was not invited to this meeting because she claimed, at that

time, to have sold all of her shares to Weiman. (R. 1537 at 90; R. 1539 at 76).
37.

The Company attempted to hold a special shareholders meeting on

April 19, 2010, but Cuong was the only shareholder in attendance and thus no
business was conducted. (Exs. D13, D14 & D15; R. 1539 at 68-74; R. 1541 at 110113).
38.

Muoi was not invited to this meeting because she was not believed

to hld any shares, having already attempted to sell them to Weiman. (R. 1537 at
90; 1539 at 71; R. 1541 at 112).
39.

In 2011, it was determined that Olivia was taking money and/or

inventory from the supermarket.

As a result of this discovery, Olivia's

employment with the Company was terminated. (R. 1541 at 29-32, 105-107, 158).
40.

Since Olivia's termination in 2011, the supermarket has been

operated entirely by Cuong and his children, including Sylvia. (R. 1539 at 121124).
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~

41.

On April 11, 2011, counsel for Plaintiffs sent the Company, Attn:

Cuong and Sylvia, a letter demanding that a special shareholders meeting be
convened at the corporate offices of the Company no later than July 1, 2011 (the
"April 2011 Demand"). This meeting was never held. (R. 1537 at 70-71; R. 1538
at 32-33; Ex. P15).
42.

On July 17, 2013, Lavinia entered into a Stock Interest Redemption

Agreement pursuant to which the Company agreed to redeem her 20,000 shares
for $138,000. (Ex. D19. See also R. 1539 at 104-106 (Cuong testimony regarding
transaction with Lavinia); R. 1541 at 36-41 (Sylvia testimony regarding
negotiations with Lavinia.))
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS' INACCURATE STATEMENTS OF FACT

Appellants set forth a statement of facts that is inaccurate and blatantly
'4)

ignores contrary evidence in the record:
SOF 4: "Cuong Trang then used the
money invested by Muoi Ha and Olivia
Ha to pay off the loans he received
from family members."
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Cuong Trang testified that the loan for
the purchase of the market came from
his uncle. (R. 1538 at 124). His wife,
Pamela Trang, testified that the loan
from Cuong' s uncle was never repaid
because the uncle told them not to do
so. (R. 1542 at 79-80). Pamela Trang
also testified that there was an
additional $328,000 in inventory that
they had to purchase from the prior
owner of the market over time. (R.
1542 at 80).

Although Cuong testified that the
money he received from Muoi was
used to pay off a loan (R. 1539 at 138),
there is no testimony indicating that it
was the loan from his uncle, as
opposed to the loan for the inventory
that had to be paid back under the
terms of the acquisition from Long Xa.
Regarding Olivia Ha, Mr. Trang
testified that the money was invested
into the market. (R. 1539 at 139). There
is no testimony that the money from
Olivia was used to pay back the loan
Cuong obtained from his uncle.
Regardless, there is no dispute that
Muoi and Olivia both contributed
money to the market and held shares in
the market. The only dispute was
whether Weiman and Lavinia were
also shareholders and, if so, how many
shares they each owned.
SOF 7: "Olivia Ha testified that
There is no such testiinony at R. 1538,
Weiman Ha gave money for the market page 54.
but that she did not know how much."
SOF 14: "The evidence was
contradictory as to whether Tax Form
2553 was filed with the IRS. Cuong
Trang and Sylvia Trang stated that it
had not been filed with the IRS ....
However Sylvia Trang testified that
Tax Form 2553 was filed with the IRS
when the Corporation filed its taxes in
2009."

Sylvia never testified that Tax Form
2553 was filed with the IRS. She
testified that information contained on
the form was used in preparing the tax
returns for certain years, and that this
was done on the advice of the
Company's accountants. (R. 1541 at
139). When Sylvia testified at 1541
page 141 that a document was filed
with the IRS she was referring to the
tax returns themselves (not the Tax
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Form 2553). Indeed, Sylvia testified
that she did not believe the original Tax
Form 2553 had ever been filed because
it was, in fact, given to her by Ellen in
2006. (R. 1541 at 125-126).
SOF 17: "Cuong Trang also testified
that he revoked Weiman Ha's ability to
write checks on the Corporate
account."

There is no such testimony on 1538
page 44. Indeed, it is Olivia, not
Cuong, who is testifying on that page.
Nor does Exhibit D6 refer to this issue.

SOF 24: "Cuong Trang and Sylvia
Trang testified that Muoi Ha was
removed from the operation of the
Corporation for stealing around
September 27, 2007."

The testimony on 1539 pages 53-55
does not refer to when Muoi was
removed from the Company. The cited
testimony relates soley to when Exhibit
D12 was prepared. The testimony on
1541 page 86 merely states that Muoi
was terminated in 2007. It does not
give a specific month.

SOF 43: "Defendant Sylvia Trang
testified that Ellen Ha originally
created these documents."

Sylvia testified that Ellen created the
original version of D6, but that Sylvia
herself created the original version of
Dll. (R. 1541 at 126-129, 132).

SOF 44: "Defendant Sylvia Trang then
disposed of the old computer donating
it to DI later that year."

Sylvia testified that the computer was
donated to DI (R. 1541 at 131, 186), but
there is no evidence that it was Sylvia
that made the donation (as opposed to
another member of the household).

SOF 54: "At trial, Defendant Sylvia
Trang testified that the stock
certificates and minute books were still
missing."

Sylvia is not testifying at 1538 page 80.
And what she actually testified was
that some (not all) of the corporate
minutes
and
other
corporate
documents were still missing. (R. 1541
at 80).
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SOF 56: "Defendant Sylvia Trang
testified that she saw the physical stock
certificates that were issued by the
Corporation in 1999"

What Sylvia testified was that she was
sitting next to Ellen when Company
stock certificates were being prepared,
and that she the ref ore believed they
were issued.
(R. 1541 at 176-177).
There is no evidence in the record,
however, of any stock certificates ever
being signed by the President or
Secretary of the Company and
delivered to the shareholders. Indeed,
Cuong testified that stock was issued
"verbally." (R. 1539 at 37).

SOF 59: "Defendant Cuong Trang and
Defendant Sylvia Trang presented
evidence that Lavinia Ha owned either
4,215, 4390, 15,700 or 20,000 shares ....
Defendant Cuong Trang testified that
Lavinia Ha gave Weiman Ha 15,700 of
her shares."

This grossly misstates the record. The
Trangs testified that they did not know
where the references to 4,215 and 4,390
on D6 and Dl 1 came frmn, and didn't
know if it was some sort of conversion
that was used by Ellen. (R. 1539, 144).
Cuong testified was that Lavinia
wanted Wieman to have some of her
originally anticipated shares. (R. 1539
at 35). But there was no testimony that
this was all of her shares, or that this
15,700 was part of her 20,000 shares.
To the contrary, Cuong testified that
while Lavinia was originally granted a
certain number of shares, she quickly
(within a week) decided that she
wanted some of those shares {15,700) to
go to Weiman Ha. (R. 1539 at 35-36,
120-121).
Cuong Trang and Sylvia Trang testified
consistently that Lavinia Ha held
20,000 shares.

SOF 60: "At no point during the

Although Lavinia did not appear and
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G.i

litigation, did Lavinia Ha ever assert to
the Court that she owned shares of the
Corporation."

testify in court, she represented
through the proxy documents and the
Redemption Agreement, which were
admitted as a business record of
Southeast Supermarket, that she held
shares in the Company. (Ex. D6, D11,
D19). There is also other evidence in
the record to establish her ownership of
these shares. See infra at 18-20.

SOF 62: "When questioned about the
accuracy of the tax returns, both
Defendant
Cuong
Trang
and
Defendant Sylvia Trang pied the Fifth
Amendment
right
against
selfincrimination rather than respond to a
question about the accuracy of the tax
returns."

Defendants
offered
testimony
·regarding the tax returns.
Sy Ivia
specifically testified that the tax returns
were prepared using the information
on Tax Form 2553 even though such
information was believed to be
inaccurate, based on the advice of the
Company's tax accountants. (R. 1541 at
81-83, 84, 139-141, 142).
She also
testified that the Company intended to
amend the tax returns, and file the
remainder of the Company's tax
required returns, after a judicial
determination on the ownership of the
Company was made. (R. 1541 at 8486). The Fifth Amendment privilege
was asserted sparingly, and only after
significant testimony on the issue had
already been provided (R. 1540 at 37,
41; R. 1542 at 70).

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING THE
OWNERSHIP AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE COMP ANY'S SHARES
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

In considering an insufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court reviews
'"the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the
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light most favorable'" to the decision of the trial court. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT
10

,r 30, 326 P.3d 645

(quoting State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46,

,r 302, 299 P.3d 892

(internal quotation marks omitted)). "So long as some evidence and reasonable
inferences support the [trial court's] findings" they should not be disturbed on
appeal. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998).
A.

Plaintiffs Failed to Marshall the Evidence in Support of the
Findings and Cannot Therefore Meet Their Burden of Persuasion
on Appeal.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of persuasion
on appeal because they f~iled to properly marshal the evidence in support of the
trial _court's findings of fact.3 Althou~,h Plaintiffs acknowledge the obligation,
they do nothing to actually meet the requirement. 4

Rather, they select the

evidence that is most favorable to their position, entirely ignoring the evidence
supporting the trial court's factual findings. Indeed, Plaintiffs carefully cull the
record to eliminate any reference to the overwhelming evidence supporting the
trial court's decision, acting as if such evidence was never there. As a result,
Plaintiffs cannot overcome the "healthy dose of deference owed to factual
3

See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (a party challenging a finding must address and
explain away the record evidence that supports the challenged finding).

4

In 2014, the Utah Supreme Court clarified that marshalling is not a procedural
requirement, the failure of which can result in dismissal of the appeal. State v.
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r,r 40-42. Rather, marshalling is a substantive obligation,
necessary to meet the burden of persuasion under the clearly erroneous
standard. Id. at ,r 41.
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findings" and cannot persuade this Court to reverse the Final Judgment. See State

v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10,

,r,i 40-42 ("[A]

party who fails to identify and deal with

supportive evidence will never persuade an appellate court to reverse under the
deferential standard of review that applies to such issues.").

B.

There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support the Trial Court's
Factual Findings Regarding the Number and Distribution of
Shares.

Plaintiffs' failure to marshal the evidence is only exacerbated by their
failure to identify the specific trial court findings they claim to be erroneous.
Their brief states simply that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial
court's findings "regarding the distribution of shares among the shareholders."
Br. at 29. Thus, it would appear that Plaintiffs object to Finding of Fact No. 15, .
which provides as follows:
On or before March 24, 1999, it was initially determined
that shares in the Company would be issued as follows:
Cuong: 65,000; Muoi: 40,000; Lavinia: 35,700; Olivia:
5,000. Lavinia later determined however, that she
wanted 15,700 of her anticipated shares to be issued to
her brother, Weiman, in recognition of the work he had
been doing at the market. It was therefore agreed that
the shares of the Company would be issued as follows:
Cuong: 65,000; Muoi: 40,000; Lavinia: 20,000; Weiman:
15,700; Olivia: 5,000.
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Specifically, Plaintiffs appear to challenge the trial court's finding that Lavinia
received 20,000 shares, and that Weiman received only 15,700 shares. 5
In so doing, Plaintiff's ignore the substantial evidence offered in support of
the trial court's findings, including the following:
•

Testimony from Cuong that Lavinia was part of the original
discussions to incorporate the market (R. 1538 at 138);

•

Corporate minutes from March 23, 1999 identifying the original
shareholders as Lavinia, Olivia, Muoi and Cuong (Ex. D05),6 and
Cuong' s testimony that those were the four originally identified
shareholders and that Weiman was added after the fact (R. 1539 at
34, 36);

•

Cuong' s testimony that Lavinia held 20,000 shares (Id. at 35, 103-04);

•

Sylvia's testimony that she was physically present when the
decisions regarding the shareholders and the number of shares were
made, and that Lavinia held 20,000 shares (R. 1541 at 118);

•

The Revocable Proxy document signed by Lavinia and dated March
23, 1999, identifying Lavinia as a shareholder and appointing
Weiman as her proxy with respect to her shares (Ex. D06);

•

The fact that Cuong discussed his intent to remove Weiman as a
Director with Lavinia (R. 1539 at 48);

5

There was no dispute that Cuong held 65,000 shares and that Olivia held 5,000
shares. Although the Defendants argued that Muoi' s 40,000 shares reverted back
to the Company due to an unauthorized sale to Weiman, the trial court found
that Muoi was not aware of the sale restrictions and that the shares therefore
remained in her possession. Defendants have not appealed from that r1:1ling, and
thus do not dispute that Muoi owns 40,000 shares.
6

Plaintiffs did not appeal the admission of these minutes.
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•

The December 10, 2004 letter to shareholders informing them that
Weiman had been removed as a director (Ex. 010), a copy of which
was mailed to Lavinia as a shareholder (R. 1539 at 46-47);7

•

The fact that this same letter was specifically discussed with Lavinia
(R. 1539 at 48);

•

The Revocation of Proxy document signed by Lavinia and dated
December 10, 2004, identifying herself as a shareholder and
revoking all previously issued proxies to Weiman (Ex. D11);

•

The April 12, 2010 notice of special shareholder meeting addressed
to Lavinia (Ex. D13), which was mailed to Lavinia, as a shareholder,
that same day (R. 1539 at 69-70); 8

•

Olivia Ha's testimony that she asked Lavinia on numerous occasions
to come to Salt Lake City for shareholder meetings. (R. 1538 at 54).

•

The fact that Lavinia came to Salt Lake City to attend a meeting at
South China House with Cuong, Weiman and Olivia on April 19,
2010, the purpose of which was to resolve disputes over claimed
ownership of shares in the Company .(R. 1538 at 102-103; R. 1540 at
189-91);

•

The fact that the Company repurchased Lavinia's 20,000 shares in
July 2013 for $138,000, after obtaining an appraisal to determine the
value of the company and the value of Lavinia's shares (R. 1539 at
104-06; R. 1541 at 40-41);9

•

The Shareholder Interest Redemption Agreement dated July 17, 2013
and signed by Lavinia, stating that she is a shareholder of 20,000
shares, that Weiman was inappropriately claiming ownership of her

7

Plaintiffs do not appeal from the admission of this letter.

8

Plaintiffs do not appeal from the admission of this evidence.

9

Although Plaintiffs appeal from the admission of the actual Shareholder
Interest Redemption Agreement, they did not object to and do not appeal from
the admission of Cuong' s and Sylvia's testimony regarding the transaction.
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shares, and that she desired to sell these shares back to the Company
(D19);

•

Cuong's testimony that Tax Form 2553 was never filed with the IRS
because it was erroneous insofar as it identified Weiman has holding
37,500 shares when; in fact, 20,000 of those shares belonged to
Lavinia (R. 1539 at 120-121);

•

Sylvia's testimony that she was present when Ellen filled out Tax
Form 2553, and that Weiman instructed Ellen to identify him as the
owner of 35,700 shares, which included 20,000 shares actually
belonging to Lavinia, because Lavinia was not there and thus he
"had say" over her shares (R. 1541 at 122-124);

•

Sylvia's testimony that Wejman told her it was stupid for her to go
to California in July 2013 (when the Company bought back Lavinia's
20,000 shares) because Weiman would not have taken Lavinia's
20,000 shares and would have given those shares back to. Lavinia.
(Id. at 119-120).
Weiman's admission that all of his siblings living in the United
States ~ad an interest in the market, either directly. or through their
spouse, and that he did not leave Lavinia out. (R. 1540 at 110-112).

Plaintiffs specifically object to the trial court's finding that Lavinia was
originally granted 35,700 shares. Again, Plaintiffs ignore the actual evidence. As
noted in the summary of the evidence in the immediately preceding pages, there
was evidence establishing the original shareholders as Cuong, Lavinia, Muoi and
Olivia. There was also evidence that Weiman was added as a shareholder a few
days later, and given 15,700 of the shares originally intended for Lavinia. There
is further evidence that Lavinia wanted to add Weiman to the list of
shareholders, and wanted to give him some of her shares.

Finally, there is

F·.

\i;jl

evidence that Lavinia ultimately ended up with 20,000 shares. Based on all of
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this evidence, it was reasonable, and not clearly erroneous, for the trial court to
infer that Lavinia was originally slated to receive 35,700 shares, that she gave
15,700 of those shares to Weiman, and that she retained the remaining 20,000. 10
Plaintiffs also appear to object to Finding of Fact No. 15, stating as follows:
Plaintiffs attempted to establish the allocation of shares
by use of the Election of S Corporation, Tax Form 2553
(the "Election Form").
The Court does not find that
this document is evidence of the proper allocation of
shares in the Company. The Election Form dated on
March 24, 1999 was prepared in handwriting by
someone other than Cuong, Weiman, Muoi and Olivia.
Those four parties testified that the Election Form was
not prepared in their own handwriting. This form
showed a different allocation of shares and was
originally signed by the parties. This document was
never filed with the IRS. Sylvia testified that while she
was living with Ellen, Ellen prepared this form at
Weiman's direction. In November 2006, Ellen found the
Election Form in her files when she moved to
Washington and mailed it to Sylvia.
But there was evidence in the record to support this finding, including:

•

Sylvia's testimony that while the form identifies the Company as an
S Corporation, the Company is actually a C Corporation (R. 1541 at
126);

•

Cuong, Muoi, Olivia and Weiman testified that they each signed the
Tax Form 2553, but that the other handwriting on the form,
including the handwriting setting forth the number of shares, did
not belong to them (R. 1537 at 133; R. 1538 at 56; R. 1540 at 95-96);

10

This inference is further supported by evidence that Weiman told Ellen to
identify him as the holder of the 35,700 when 20,000 of those shares actually
belonged to Lavinia. (R. 1541 at 122-124).
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•

Sylvia's testimony that she lived with Ellen for a period of time and
frequently saw her writing, and that the writing on the Tax Form
2553, and in particular the writing depicting the number of shares,
belonged to Ellen (R. 1541 at 120-123);

•

Sylvia's testimony that she was present when Ellen prepared the Tax
Form 2553, and that it was filled out based on directions from
Weiman (Id. at 122-123);

•

Sylvia's testimony that she heard Weiman tell Ellen to add Lavinia's
20,000 shares to his 15,700 shares, and to identify him as the holder
of 35,700 shares (Id. at 123-124);

•

Sylvia's testimony that when Ellen moved from Utah to Washington
in 2006 she located the original Tax Farm 2553 in her files and
mailed it to Sylvia (Id. at 125); and

•

Sylvia's testimony that the original Tax Form 2553 was in an
envelope addressed to the IRS, but that the envelope did not contain
any markings indicating that it had ever been mailed to the IRS (Id.
at 126).

Plaintiffs ignore all of this evidence in arguing that the trial court's findings were
clearly erroneous.
Plaintiffs claim that the stock breakdown set forth in Tax Form 2553 was
supported by the corporate tax filings made in 2009. Again, Plaintiffs ignore
evidence as to why the tax returns contained this information.

Specifically,

Plaintiffs ignore the unrefuted testimony from Sylvia that the tax filings were
prepared using the information on Tax Form 2553 on the advice of the Company
accountants, because the Company was under the gun to file overdue returns,
and the form was the only documentation in their physical possession at the time
purporting to identify the shareholders and the number of shares held. (R. 1541
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at 81-82, 84, 141). Plaintiffs also ignore Sylvia's testimony that the accountants
advised her not to amend the returns with the correct shareholder information
until a judicial determination had been made regarding the actual ownership of
the Company's shares, in order to avoid having repeated amendments to the
filings. (R. 1541 at 84). In short, there was ample evidence from which the trial
,;;

court could reasonably conclude that the tax returns did not accurately reflect the
shareholders or the number of shares held because they were based entirely on
the Tax Form 2553, which was itself inaccurate.
Plaintiffs claim that Tax Form 2553 was supported by the testimony of
Cuong, stating that he and Muoi, Olivia and Weiman were original shareholders.
But there is nothing in the cited testimony whereby Cuong states that these four
individuals were the only original shareholders.

Defendants asserted

throughout the proceedings that Lavinia was one of the original shareholders.

See Defendants' Rule 26 Initial Disclosures, App'x C hereto (identifying Lavinia
vi>

as a person with information regarding "[a]cquisition and ownership of shares of
Southeast Supermarket"). 11

viJ

And there was ample evidence to establish that

Lavinia indeed held 20,000 shares. See supra at 18-20.

11

Defendants also asserted Lavinia's ownership of the shares during the first
mediation, which was held in July 2012.
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C.

The Trial Court's Credibility Determinations Were Not Clearly
Erroneous.

Plaintiffs suggest that the trial court's findings should be reversed because
it determined that the Trangs were the more credible witnesses. But '"[i]t is the
province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses,"' and this Court
"will not second-guess the trial court where there is a reasonable basis to support
its findings." Woodward v. Lafranca, 2013 UT App 147,

,r 7, 305 P.3d 181 (quoting

Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991)); see also State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342,
345 (Utah 1985) ("'It is the exclusive function of [the trier of fact] to weigh the
evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.' (quoting State v.

Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)). A trial court's determination of credibility
will be reversed only if "its findings in support of that determination are 'clearly
erroneous,"' meaning that those findings are '"against the clear weight of the
evidence,"' or if the "appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made." Woodward, 2013 UT App 147,

,r

7

(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
There was a reasonable basis for the trial court to discredit the testimony of
Plaintiffs, its findings were not clearly erroneous or against the clear weight of
the evidence, and there is no basis for this court to reach a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.

24

Regarding Muoi, there was evidence establishing that she stole -money
..;;

from the Company (see supra at 9, Appellees' Statement of Fact 131), even though
she denied it on the stand. (R. 1537 at 105). Muoi also testified that it was her
husband that started Global Supermarket to compete with the Company, despite
prior sworn and other admissions that it was her store. (Id. at 111-117; R. 1539 at
62; see also Ex. D38 at 5; Ex P10). Finally, Muoi claimed not to know about
Weiman's removal as a Director (R. 1537 at 74), despite Weiman's own testimony
that she (and everyone else) was aware of his removal. (R. 1540 at 116).
Regarding Olivia, she testified that she did not discuss her concerns about
the Trangs' operation of the business with Muoi in 2011, despite directly contrary
vJ

statements in her Verified Complaint. (R. 1538 at 61-64; D38 at 6). Olivia also
claimed not to remember when she divorced her own husband. (R. 1538 at 4446).

And like Muoi, Olivia denied knowing about Weiman's removal as a

Director (id. at 24-25), despite Weiman's own testimony that she (and everyone
vJ

else) was aware. (R. 1540 at 116).
Regarding Weiman, he testified that he changed the name of the market
from Tay Do to New Tay Do, and that this was done a year after the market
opened, in 1998.

(Id. at 73-76).

But records on file with the Division of

Corporations confirm that the name was changed by Cuong in 1997, before
Weiman even moved back to Salt Lake. (Id. at 77). Weiman claimed in the
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Verified Complaint that he was the one that prepared Tax Form 2553, 12 but
testified at trial that it was Cuong. (Id. at 52). In fact, the overwhelming evidence
in the record supports the conclusion that it was prepared by his daughter, Ellen.

(See supra at 21). Indeed, Weiman's testimony regarding Tax Form 2553, and
Ellen's involvement therein, was evasive at best. (R. 1540 at 104-105). Weiman
claimed not to know about his removal as Director (id. at 60), despite his own
claim that his sisters and everyone else knew (id. at 116), and despite evidence
that he was informed of such in a letter from Cuong. (Id. at 44-47; Ex. D9).
Weiman also claimed to have been the one that negotiated the deal for the
original acquisition of the market, but was unable to provide any specific details
regarding the terms of the deal. (Id. at 115-116). 13 Finally, Weiman told counsel
to "eat shit" when pressed on certain issues during cross-examination. (R. 1540
at 78-79).
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court's credibility determinations were clearly
erroneous because they were based on irrelevant evidence. There are multiple
problems with this argument.

First, Plaintiffs fail to identify the specific

12

Weiman also claimed to be the author of Tax Form 2553 in the course of
discovery. (R. 1540 at 91-92).

13

Indeed, Weiman referred to the selling party as "Tay Do", when in fact that
was the name of the business. (R. 1540 at 48). The selling party was named Long
Xa. (R. 1538 at 124).
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allegedly irrelevant evidence that was improperly considered by the trial court in
making its credibility determinations. 14 Thus, this Court has no way to assess
whether the evidence in question was relevant or not. Second, Plaintiffs cite to
nothing in the record to suggest that they objected to the allegedly irrelevant
evidence when it was offered below. Because they failed to establish that they
~

preserved the relevance issue below, the issue cannot be considered on appeal.

Brady v. Park, 2013 UT App 97,

,r 38, 302 P.3d 1220 (to be preserved for appeal, an

issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an
opportunity to rule on that issue (quotations and citations omitted)). Third,
Plaintiffs believe that that relevance may be determined only with respect to
their own theories of the case. In fact, relevance must be determined considering
the case as a whole, based not only on the plaintiff's claims but also on the
defenses asserted in the defendant's answer .15

14

Plaintiffs likely object to evidence of their theft and embezzlement. But it was
the Plaintiffs who put this misconduct at issue by alleging they were fired, and
forced out of the business, without cause. (R. at 207-209). Having opened this
door, they cannot complain that such evidence was admitted and considered by
the trail court.
15

Plaintiffs note that Defendants did not file any counterclaims. They did,
however, file an answer setting forth a number of affirmative defenses. (R. 276286)
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D.

Plaintiffs' Claims of Inconsistent Testimony by the Trangs Are
Flawed and Do Not Require Reversal on Appeal.

Plaintiffs claim that the Trangs' testimony should be discredited because
their testimony was "inconsistent." 16 But their claims of inconsistency do not
withstand scrutiny.

1.

The Trangs Did Not Offer Inconsistent Testimony
Regarding the Existence of Stock Certificates.

Plaintiffs suggest that there was an inconsistency with respect to the
existence of stock certificates. Specifically, they assert that Cuong testified there
were no physical stock certificates, while Sylvia claimed that such certificates
were issued. Plaintiffs misconstrue Sylvia's testimony in order to create an
inconsistency that does not exist. What Sylvia testified was that she was sitting
next to Ellen when she was preparing stock certificates (R. 1541 at 176-177).
Sylvia never testified that such certificates were ever actually signed or delivered
to Plaintiffs (or other shareholders). 17 This testimony is consistent with the
testimony of Cuong that he believed certificates were prepared, but that they
were never signed (R. 1539 at 37), and that shares were only issued "verbally."

(Id.).
16

Insofar as Plaintiffs are attempting to establish such inconsistencies through
their statement of facts, those inconsistencies have been addressed in above. See
supra at 11-15.
17

When asked if the certificates were issued, Sylvia stated she "believed so"
because she was there when they were prepared. (R. 1541 at 176-177).
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2.

The Trangs Did Not Offer Inconsistent Testimony
Regarding the Number of Shares Held by Lavinia.

Plaintiffs note that thew Trangs could not explain the discrepancy between
the stock figures set forth on D6 and D11 (the proxy documents), which identify
Lavinia's holdings as 4,215 and 4,390, and the Trangs' testimony that she owned
20,000. The evidence is undisputed, however, that the original proxy document
(D6) was created by Ellen, and that the Trangs did not know where Ellen
obtained the share numbers contained on those proxy documents. (R. 1539 at
~

139). The Trangs were consistent in testifying that Lavinia invested $20,000 and
held 20,000 shares. (R. 1539 at 35; R. 1541 at 118). And this number is confirmed
through the representations and warranties set forth in the Redemption
Agreement that was signed by Lavinia in July 2013. (D19). While the_ evidence
may have been conflicting, there was ample evidence for the trial court to
conclude that the correct figure was 20,000 (rather than either of the figures set
forth on Exhibits D6 and D11).
3.

The Defendants Did Not Offer Inconsistent Testimony
Regarding Weiman Ha's Possession of Corporate Records.

Plaintiffs claim that the Trangs lied when they suggested, in response to
Plaintiffs' demands for a meeting, that Plaintiffs (and Weiman in particular) had
corporate records and stock certificates in his possession.

But the evidence

supported the Trangs' belief that such documents existed and were in the
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possession of Weiman. Cuong and Sylvia both testified that Weiman delivered
boxes of q.ocuments to them after they requested such information in order to
complete the tax filings. (R. 1541 at 49-62). And there are contemporaneously
created business records to support these claims. (D23). Finally, Sylvia provided
extensive testimony regarding the discovery of corporate documents in the
Weiman' s "little room," as follows:
Weiman built the little room in a back corner of the warehouse at the
back of the market (R. 1541 at 65, 68);

•

Weiman had a bed in the room and was the only one that used the
room (Id. at 66, 68);

•

Weiman had the only key, which he threw away when he was fired
from the Company (R. 1539 at 176-177; R. 1540 at 83-84; R. 1541 at
65-66; see also R. 1540 at 82 (Weiman had a key but was "not sure
about the others");
Sylvia hired Glen's Key Lock and Safe to open the door to Weiman's
little room because Weiman was not cooperating in the production
of documents needed to complete the Company's tax returns (R.
1541 at 63-66);18

•

Sylvia and her cousin, Jonathan Trang (Olivia's son), entered the
room after it was unlocked (Id. at 66-67);

•

There were boxes of documents scattered throughout the room, and
there were also documents strewn about on the bed and elsewhere
(Id. at 68-69, 73-74);

18

Plaintiffs criticized Sylvia for not having the room unlocked earlier. But Sylvia
testified that Chinese culture is hierarchical, that it is not customary for family
members to question the patriarch (i.e., Weiman), and that she waited as long as
she could out of respect for his position in the family. (R. 1541 at 173-74).
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•

Some of the boxes contained invoices, bank statements, cleared
checks, and other Company financial records (Id. at 68-69, 72-74);

•

Other corporate documents, including corporate minutes, articles of
incorporation and bylaws, were also found inside the room (Id. at
72-74);

•

Not all of the documents Sylvia was attempting to find were located
in the little room (Id. at 174-176; see also R. 1540 at 25); and

•

Some of the still missing documents included sales tax records, daily
sales receipts, and additional corporate minutes (R. 1541 at 80).

As discussed above, there was also evidence that Sylvia had a reason to believe
that Ellen had prepared stock certificates, and that those draft certi!icates, even if
unsigned and unissued, may have been in the possession of Weiman. 19 (Supra at
27-28).
4.

Defendants Did Not Offer Fabricated Proxy Documents.

Plaintiffs claim that the Trangs fabricated evidence. Specifically, Plaintiffs
refer to Exhibits D6 and D11 - the Revocable Proxy and Revocation of Proxy. But
Sylvia offered extensive testimony regarding how those documents were created,
~

and why they were mere duplicate copies of the originals rather than
fa bric a tions:

19

Defendants produced a series of unsigned stock certificates during the course
of discovery. (SM000018-20). While these documents were not offered or
received into evidence, it is disingenuous for Plaintiffs to suggest thaf the Trangs
had no reason to believe there might be additional certificates, even draft and
unsigned, in the possession of Weiman.
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•

Sylvia was present when Ellen prepared D6 (the Revocable Proxy)
on a computer at the Trang ho1ne in 1999, and was also present
when that document was signed by Lavinia (R. 1541 at 126-129);

•

Lavinia mailed the signed document to Cuong (R. 1539 at 37-38);
Sylvia prepared D11 (the Revocation of Proxy) on a computer at the
Trang home and sent the document to Lavinia for signing (R. 1541 at
132);

Cuong received the document, signed by Lavinia, in the mail (R.
1540, 22-23);

•

Sylvia knew that the signed documer:its existed but could not locate
them in Weiman's little room (or elsewhere) (R. 1541 at 129, 133);

•

Sylvia found the original version of these documents on the
computers located at the Trang home (Id. at 129);

•

The computers were outdated and the orig~nal forms could not
therefore be emailed or printed (Id. at 130, 134);

•

Sylvia retyped the original forms on her own computer and emailed
them to Lavinia to be resigned (R. 1541 at 130-131, 135-136, 185-186);

•

Sylvia received the documents, resigned by Lavinia, in the mail (R.
1541 at 131, 136); and

•

Sylvia did not disclose them as "reconstructions" or "re-creations"
when they were produced and initially offered into evidence
because she viewed them as mere copies of documents that she
knew to already exist (Id. at 179; R. 1542 at 55-56).

Plaintiffs claim that Sylvia cannot be trusted based on Cuong' s testimony that it
was actually Lavinia that prepared D6 and D11. But it was within the discretion
of the trial court to conclude that it was, in fact, Ellen who prepared the original
Revocable Proxy (Ex. D6), and Sylvia who prepared the original Revocation of
Proxy (Ex. D11), that those original documents were then sent to Lavinia for
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signing, and to infer that Cuong incorrectly assumed it was Lavinia that drafted
them after he received them in the mail from her.
Ultimately, it was for the trial court to consider the evidence presented and
determine whether or not the actions associated with these documents rendered
the Trangs' testimony not credible. The trial court determined that it did not,
~

and there was nothing clearly erroneous about this determination.

5.

Defendants Did Not Offer Inconsistent Testimony
Regarding Sylvia Witnessing the Preparation of Tax Form
2553 or the Execution of the Revocable Proxy by Lavinia.

Plaintiffs challenge Sylvia's testimony that she was in the backroom of the
market when Ellen prepared Tax Form 2553, claiming that this testimony
conflicts with her claim that she was with Lavinia when she signed Exhibit D6 the proxy document. It was reasonable for the court to infer, however, that while
JJ

the proxy document is dated March 23, 1999, Lavinia did not actually sign the
document until Ellen and Sylvia to California returned and gave it to her to sign.
This inference is particularly reasonable given that the date on the proxy
document was typed, rather than handwritten. All that Sylvia testified at trial
was that she saw the document being signed by Lavinia in 1999 (R. 1541 at 127).
Althought the document itself is dated and effective March 23, 1999, Sylvia never
testified that she saw Lavinia sign the document on that sp·ecific date, as opposed
to some date shortly thereafter.
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6.

Defendants Did Not Offer Inconsistent Testimony
Regarding the Removal of Weiman as a Director.

Plaintiffs claim that Cuong' s testimony regarding the removal of Weiman
was inconsistent. Specifically, they claim that he could not have been removed
as a Director on December 10, 2004, because he signed two checks thereafter-on
December 24, 2004 and December 31, 2004, and because he was not removed as a
Director with the Division of Corporations until March 8, 20i0. Once again,
Plaintiffs pick and choose the evidence in the record to create an inconsistency
that does not actually exist.
The fact that Weiman continued to sign checks after December 10, 2004,
does not mean that he was authorized to do so, or that he did so in the capacity
of a Director of the Company. Indeed, the evidence establishes that even after
Weiman was removed as a Director, he continued to work at the market as an
employee. (R. 1541 at 173). The evidence further established that the checkbook
was kept in a location where it could be easily accessed by Weiman during this
period of time, and that Weiman had previously written checks outside of the
presence of Cuong. (R. 1541 at 46-47). Thus, the fact that he continued to sign
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checks even after he had been removed and told not to sign anymore does not
mean that he was not removed and stripped of his check writing authority. 20
Likewise, the fact that the Company did not take steps to formally remove
Weiman as a director with the Division of Corporations does not :r:nean that they
did not take internal steps to remove him from his position. Sylvia testified that
..;

the only reason he was not removed from the State records sooner was because
she didn't realize it was something that needed to be done until she was using

vti>

the online renewal service for the first time in 2010. (R. 1541 at 43-45). It was not
unreasonable for the trial court to accept this testimony and conclude that
Weiman had been removed from his position back in 2004, and that the
Company simply failed to take the steps necessary to remove his name from the
Division of Corporation records at that time. 21

20

~

viJ

Plaintiffs suggest that Weiman had the authority to sign the checks because he
was a signatory on the account and there is no evidence that Cuong went to the
bank to remove his name. While these facts may justify a bank's actions in
cashing the check, they would not excuse VVeiman's unauthorized use of
Company funds to pay for personal expenses and/ or the expenses of his
restaurant. Such use of the Company funds would be improper even by an
authorized signatory on the account, and would therefore justify termination.
21

Weiman could have taken steps to remove himself from the Division of
Corporation records. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-l0a-1608; see also id. § 16-l0a807(3); id. § -808(5); id. § -809(4).
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY ADMIT HEARSAY OR
RELY ON HEARSAY STATEMENTS IN ITS FINDINGS.

Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that the trial court should be reversed because
it erroneously admitted hearsay testimony and then relied on the erroneously

adm.itted testimony in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial
court's decision on admissibility is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Workman, 2005 UT 66,

,r 10, 122 P.3d 639 (citing

Eggert v. Wasatch Energy Corp.,

2004 UT 28, ,IlO, 94 P.3d 193). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting any evidence.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to strike five paragraphs from the trial court's
Findings of Fact-18, 29, 32, 33, and 47 -for purported improper reliance on
hearsay statements. All of these paragraphs support the trial court's Conclusion
of Law that Lavinia held shares in the corporation.
Plaintiffs' arguments with respect to these paragraphs are flawed for
several reasons, as explained in detail herein. First, the Has overlook that the fact
that the ev~dence was properly admitted under the business records exception to
the hearsay rule. Second, in some instances, Plaintiffs failed to even object to the
purported hearsay testimony in the trial court, and thus they did not preserve
their arguments for appeal. Finally, the evidence Plaintiffs assert was incorrectly
admitted and relied on by the trial court was not in fact hearsay because it was
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not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Each paragraph to which
Plaintiffs object is addressed in turn below.
A.

Paragraph 18 of the Findings of Fact is Not Based on Improperly
Admitted Hearsay.

Paragraph 18 of the trial court's Findings of Fact states:
On March 23, 1999, Lavinia, who lived and worked in
California, executed a proxy authorizing her brother,
Weiman, to vote her shares in the Company in her
absence. Unlike the other Ha family members, Lavinia
was not involved in the day-to-day running of the
market. Sylvia testified that she was also living with
Lavinia at the time, and Lavinia showed her the
document and explained it to her. Cuong also testified
that he received the signed proxy mailed from Lavinia
around that time.
App'x A at 4. Plaintiffs objected to the admission of the Revoca~le Proxy
document (Exhibit D6) demonstrating that Lavinia authorized Weiman to vote
v;;)

her shares in the company in her absence. However, the document was properly
admitted as a business record. (R. 1539 at 38-39). Utah Rule of Evidence 803(6)
provides that records of regularly conducted activity of a business is not
excluded by the hearsay rule if:
(A) the record was made at or near the time by-or
from information transmitted by-someone with
knowledge; (B) the record was kept in the ordinary
course of a regularly conducted activity of a business,
organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for
profit; (C) making the record was a regular practice of
that activity; (D) all these conditions are shown by the
testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness
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. . . and (E) neither the source of information nor the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack
of trustworthiness.
Utah R. Evid. 803(6). All of these requirements are satisfied here, as Cuong, the
Company president and one of its records custodian, testified that the proxy
documents were kept by the market in the regular and ordinary course of
business, and keeping such records was the Company's regular practice. (R.
1539 at 38-39). The testimony also demonstrated that the Revocable Proxy was
signed by Lavinia near the time it was created. (R. 1539 at 37-38, 40; R. 1541 at
126-129); see also Section I(D)(4) supra. Nor is there anything in the record to
indicate a lack of trustworthiness such that it was an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to admit the document under the exception. 22
Even if in error, the admission of the Revocable Proxy (Ex. D6) would be
harmless given that there was ample non-hearsay evidence demonstrating the
fact that Lavinia owned shares in the Company. See Section I(B) supra; see also In

re J.C., 808 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that harmless error

22

Plaintiffs argue that the Revocable Proxy (D6) and Revocation of Proxy (D11)
documents are not trustworthy because they were "fabricated" by Sylvia.
However, Sylvia testified extensively about the original creation of these
documents and the need to re-create the originals, which were known to exist
but could not be located in Weiman's little room (or elsewhere), for proper
recordkeeping purposes. The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, found
this testimony credible, and that decision should be affirmed. See Section I(D)(4)
supra.
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doctrine applied to appellant's claim that juvenile court improperly admitted
hearsay evidence when other non-hearsay evidence supported the juvenile
court's conclusions).
B.

Paragraph 29 of the Findings of Fact is Not Based on Improperly
Admitted Hearsay.

Paragraph 29 of the trial court's Findings of Fact states:
Around this same time, Lavinia revoked the proxy she
had given to Weiman to vote her shares in the
company. The proxy revocation was mailed to and
received by Cuong [Trang].
App'x A at 6.

Like the Revocable Proxy document discussed above, this

Revocation of Proxy Document (Ex. D11) was properly admitted by the trial
court as a business record. (R. 1539 at 50). Proper foundation was laid by Cuong
about this document being regularly kept in the course of business. (R. 1539 at
~

48-50). Cuong also testified that he recognized Lavinia's signature on the
document, that Lavinia mailed the document to him, and that the revocation of
proxy was the type of document that the market keeps and maintains in the
regular and ordinary course of business.

(Id.; see also Section I(D)(4) supra).

Moreover, there is no indication that the document lacks trustworthiness such
that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to admit the document into
evidence. (See note 17, supra).

Finally, like the Revocable Proxy document

discussed above, the admission of this Revocation of Proxy document, even if it
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was erroneous (though it was not), is subject to the harmless error doctrine given
that ample non-hearsay evidence supported the finding that Lavinia Ha owned
shares in the Company. See Section I(B) supra.
C.

Paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Findings of Fact are Not Based on
Impr~perly Admitted Hearsay.

Paragraphs 32 and 33 of the trial court's Findings of Fact state:
32.
In May 2009, Cuong and Sylvia discovered that
the tax filings had not been filed with the federal
government and state.
33. The Company later filed several tax returns based
on the incomplete corporate records, including the
Election form, and incorrectly stated the stock
shareholders [held] in the Company. The Court finds
the testimony credible that the Company was waiting,
on the advice of the accounting professionals, for the
Court's determination of ownership.
App'x A at 7. Plaintiffs argue that the court erroneously allowed in hearsay
evidence about what the letters from the taxing authorities stated and also about
the advice of the accounting professionals. (Br. at 27-28).
With respect to paragraph 32, Plaintiffs failed to object to this evidence and
their argument is therefore not preserved. Brady v. Park, 2013 UT App 97,

,r 38,

302 P.3d 1220 (to be preserved for appeal, an issue must be presented to the trial
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue
(quotations and citations omitted)). The following exchange took place at trial
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when counsel for the Trangs was conducting the direct examination of Sylvia
Trang:
Q.
Did there come a time when you learned that tax
returns · had not been filed on behalf of Southeast
Supermarket?
A.

Yes.

Q.

When did you learn this?

A.

That was May 2009?

Q.

And how did you learn this?

...c)

A.
We learned about it through a letter throughthat was sent to Southeast by the Utah State Tax
Commission.

(R. 1541 at 49.) Counsel for Plaintiffs did not object until later, after counsel for
the Trangs asked what the letter from the Utah State Tax Commission actually
stated. Id. at 49-50. Paragraph 32, which merely addresses the afact that the lack
of tax filings was discovered, is therefore fully supported by the testimony
quoted above to which no objection was lodged.
The findings articulated by the trial court in Paragraph 32 are also
supported by the corporate minutes in Exhibit D23, which contain statements
...J

about the company receiving notice from the taxing authorities that taxes had not
been filed by Southeast. The minutes were properly admitted by the trial court as
business records. (R. 1541 at 53-55). Again, the admission of these records under
Utah Rule of Evidence 803(6) was proper because foundation was laid that the
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minutes were created by Sylvia on the same day that the meeting was held, that
the record was kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted activity of
the business, that making the record was a regular practice of that activity. (R.
1541 at 50-54). In addition, there is no evidence indicating that the corporate
minutes in Exhibit D23 suffer from a lack of trustworthiness. The trial court did
not, therefore, err in making its findings in paragraph 32.
Regarding Paragraph 33, Plaintiffs argue that this finding is based on
hearsay because it relies on out-of-court statements of accountants who advised
the company not to file amended tax returns listing Lavinia as a shareholder
until ownership of the Company was determined in court. For several reasons,
Plaintiffs' argument with respect to Paragraph 33 fails.
First, counsel for Plaintiffs failed to object to the introduction of this
testimony. The following exchange took place when Defendnats' counsel was
conducting the examination of Sylvia:
Did you believe that Lavinia was a shareholder at
the time that the tax returns were prepared?

Q.

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

So why does she not appear in the tax returns?

A.
Because this was the only document and the best
document that I could find at that time to prepare the
tax returns .... And I was advised to file it as soon as I
can, just to file it so it's there and that-and that we
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could amend the records when we find the correct
information.

Q.

So why haven't you amended your tax filings?

A.
Because of-of the rmss1ng minutes, the
paperwork along the lines, and because where I was
advised by accountants to- that we should wait
because of this litigation, because of this lawsuit, and
because we're waiting for a judicial ruling before we
could actually re-file so we wouldn't have to constantly
amend our tax filings.

(R. 1541 at 84-86). No objection to this testimony was made by Plaintiffs' counsel.
~

Indeed, Plaintiffs' counsel actually elicited further testimony about the advice of
accountants from Sylvia. (R. 1542 at 66). Plaintiffs cannot now take advantage of
this supposed error when it was their counsel who helped elicit the purportedly
objectionable testimony. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1202, 1220 (Utah 1993)
(discussing invited error doctrine).
Plaintiffs contend that a continuing objection preserves their argument
with respect to Paragraph 33. However, a review of the record demonstrates that
the continuing objection was not intended to cover all supposed hearsay
statements in the course of the seven-day trial, but rather was limited to matters

~

having to do with the allegedly hearsay statements of Ellen, a third-party not
present at trial.

(See R. 1538 at 135-136, 139-140).

Thus, Plaintiffs did not

properly preserve their objection to the testimony now claimed to be hearsay,
and this Court should decline to consider it on appeal.
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In addition and alternatively, the findings in Paragraph 33 are not based
on hearsay because the statements by Sylvia regarding the advice of the
company's accountants were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It is
fundamental that hearsay is· defined as a statement that "a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c)(2). The
testimony about the advice of accountants was not presented to prove that what
the accountants stated to Sylvia was true, but rather that it was said and that
Sylvia acted on the statement in electing not to file amended Company tax
returns listing Lavinia as a shareholder. This evidence therefore falls outside of
the hearsay rule, and there was no error in the trial court ad1nitting it and using
it to support its Findings of Fact.
D.

Paragraph 47 of the Findings of Fact is Not Based on Improperly
Admitted Hearsay.·

Paragraph 47 of the trial court's findings states:
On July 17, 2013, Lavinia entered into a Stock Interest
Redemption Agreement pursuant to which the
Company agreed to redeem her 20,000 shares for
$138,000.
App'x A at 9. Plaintiffs objected to the admission of the Stock Interest
Redemption Agreement (Ex. D19), but the trial court admitted it holding that it
was a business record. (R. 1539 at 111-116). Like the other documents discussed
herein, proper foundation was laid for the admission of this document as a
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business record by Cuong, the Company's president. (R. 1539 at 104-108). Also,
like the other documents discussed herein, even if the Redemption Agreement
itself was admitted in error, the admission would be harmless because there was
ample non-hearsay evidence to support the finding.

Namely, there was

unobjected to testimony from Cuong and Sylvia regarding the stock transaction
~

that is separate and appart form the allegedly hearsay agreement. (R. 1539 at
104-106; R. 1541 at 36-41). The admission of the Redemption Agreement, even if
erroneous (which it was not), was also harmless because the fact that Lavinia
owned 20,000 shares in the Company was established by ample evidence. See
Section I(B).
In sum, all of Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the trial court's Findings of
Fact being based on hearsay are unavailing, the trial court did not commit error,
and the trial court's challenged findings should be affirmed.
III.

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE LAVINIA HA A
PARTY TO THE CASE BEFORE INTRODUCING EVIDENCE ABOUT
HER SHARES IN THE COMPANY.

In its ruling, and based on evidence submitted by Defendants, the trial
court found that Lavinia contributed money to the market, was to initially
receive 35,700 shares, but gave 15,700 of those shares to Weiman, leaving her
with 20,000 shares. The trial court also found that on July 17, 2013, Lavinia
entered into a Stock Interest Redemption Agreement pursuant to which the
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Company agreed to redeem her 20,000 shares for $138,000. (Findings of Fact,
App'x A, at ,r,r 9, 16, 47.)
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court should be reversed because Defendants
should not have been able to introduce evidence about Lavinia's shares in the
Company and the agreement by which the Company purchased those shares
because she was not a party to the case. Plaintiffs cite Utah Rule of Civil
11

Procedure 14, which states: At any time after commencement of the action a
defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be
served on a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all
or part of the Plaintiff's claim against him." They argue that Defendants were
required to join Lavinia as a party before any evidence could have been admitted
regarding L~vinia' s interest in Southeast Supermarket. (Br. at 39).
This argument fails. As a threshold matter, the rule is permissive. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 14 (setting forth when a party "may" join a third-party). It does
not require that a third-party be added to the case before evidence about that
party can be offered to the court. 23

23

Compulsory joinder is addressed in Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. But Plaintiffs did not cite or analyze that rule anywhere in their brief,
and have therefore waived any error allegedly relating thereto. See Pixton v. State
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Generally,
where an appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is waived."). Even
if they had timely raised the issue, however, it would not require reversal. The
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Moreover, Rule 14 relates solely to the addition of a· party that might be
liable on the Plaintiffs' claims. The rule does not apply in a case, such as this,
that does not assert liability and seeks only equitable relief-namely, the calling
of a shareholders' meeting. (See Verified Complaint, R. 7-11.)
As noted by Plaintiffs, a third-party claim may be asserted under Rule
-vJ

14(a) only when the third party's liability is in some way dependent on the
outcome of the main claim, or when the third-party is secondarily liable to
defendant. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 960 n.8 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). There is no imaginable scenario under which Lavinia (the third-party)
would be liable to them if Plaintiffs were successful on their cause of action
seeking a shareholders' meeting. Thus, a request to bring Lavinia in as a party
would have been futile and wholly improper under Rule 14(a).
Plaintiffs suggest that the Trangs had a fiduciary duty to Lavinia to protect
Lavinia's interests in the corporation. See Br. at 40. They hypothesize that if there

~

had been an adverse ruling against Defendants, any stock claimed by Lavinia
could be negatively impacted, meaning that the Trangs could be liable to Lavinia.

whole point of the doctrine is to ensure that the parties in the case are not
unfairly exposed to conflicting or multiple liabilities due to the absence of the
third party. But the absence of Lavinia in this case did not expose Plaintiffs to
any such potential exposure. Nor do they claim it did. At the end of the day,
Plaintiff simply disliked that they could not examine Lavinia directly regarding
her shares. But if Plaintiffs felt such examination critical to their case they should
have taken a trial preservation or attempted themselves to bring her to court.
47

Id.

There are multiple problems with this argument.

First, Plaintiff fails to

articlulate exactly how an adverse ruling would harm Lavinia. Second, Plaintiffs
fail to explain how they themselves have standing to assert the issue. 24 And
third, and most importantly, this is simply note a scenario which Rule 14(a)
applies. As noted, Rule 14(a) is for circumstances where a defendant brings in
someone who may have liability to them for the claims of the plaintiff. It does
not apply where the defendant itself may be potentially liable to the third-party.

See Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 768 P.2d at 960 n.8 (noting that 14(a) typically deals with
situations involving indemnity, subrogation, contribution, express or implied
warranty and the like, which are properly brought in a third-party complaint).
Plaintiffs argument regarding the absence of Lavinia also fails because it
was not timely asserted and has therefore been waived. Prior to trial, Plaintiffs
not once suggested that Lavinia was a necessary party in the action, or should
have been brought in as a party by Defendants. This is depite the fact that
Defendants asserted throughout the proceedings that Lavinia was one of the
original shareholders.

See Defendants' Rule 26 Initial Disclosures, App'x C

hereto {identifying Lavinia Ha as a person with information regarding
24

Whether the Trangs could be held liable to Lavinia is no business at all. But
even if one assumes for the sake of arcument that some fiduciary duty was_ owed,
the Trangs exercised that duty by taking steps to ensure that Lavinia was
compensated for her shares in the Company before any adverse decision
potentially invalidating those shares had been made.
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"[a]cquisition and ownership of shares of Southeast Supermarket"). 25

Had

Plaintiffs believed it was a problem not having her in the case they should have
and could have either moved to join her themselves, or moved to require
Defendants to do so. They did not.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Plaintiffs have not cited any
v£J

authority for the proposition that a third-party must be brought in as a party to a
case before evidence regarding the interests of that party may be introduced. 26 In

~

sum, the trial court properly considered the Stock Purchase and Redemption
Agreement, as well as other evidence regarding Lavinia's shares in its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment. The trial court did not err in
concluding that Lavinia had to be a party before evidence of her interests could
be received, and that decision should therefore be affirmed.

25

Defendants also asserted Lavinia's ownership of the shares during the first
mediation, which was held in July 2012.

26

Indeed, no such authority exists. The issue in this case was what Plaintiffs held
and what Coung held. The involvement of Lavinia as a shareholder, and the
subsequent redemption of her shares, was relevant evidence in answer these
questions. And there was no need to have her there as a party in order for such
evidence to be submitted to the trial court.

49

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFFS'
REQUEST FOR A SPECIAL SHAREHOLDERS MEETING WAS
DEFICIENT; EVEN IF THAT DETERMINATION WAS IN ERROR, IT
WAS HARMLESS BECAUSE THE COURT IN FACT ORDERED A
SHAREHOLDERS' MEETING.

Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred by determining that their April
2011 letter did not constitute a proper demand for a shareholders' meeting.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 16-10a-702(1)(b), however, a proper demand
for a special shareholders' meeting must be signed and dated by a shareholder or
shareholders holding at least a 10 percent interest in the company, and must be

delivered to the company's secretary.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-701(1)(b)

(emphasis added).
In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that "[o]n April 11, 2011,
counsel for Plaintiffs sent the Company, Attn: Cuong and Sylvia, a letter
demanding that a special shareholders meeting be convened at the corporate
offices of the Company no later than July 1, 2011 (the II April 2011 Demand")." In
its Conclusions of Law, the trial court determined that the "April 2011 Demand
did not comply with Utah law because it was signed and sent by Plaintiffs'
counsel, and was not signed and dated by any of the shareholders in the
company." (Conclusion of Law

,r 9, App'x A hereto.)

Plaintiffs argue that the demand was proper even though it was signed by
their attorney because of two principles of agency law: that "Utah courts have
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long recognized that a client may be bound by the actions of their attorneys
when the attorney is acting within the confines of their authority" and "the
kn,owledge of an agent concerning the business which he is transacting for his
principal is to be imputed to his principal." Br. of Appellant at 42.
Defendants do not dispute that the case law cited by Plaintiffs stands for
-J

the propositions that Plaintiffs' attorney can bind them by his actions and that
knowledge of the attorney's actions can likewise bind Plaintiffs. The Trangs do
dispute the relevancy of this case law.

The question here, however, is not

whether Plaintiffs were in fact bound to go through with the meeting by virtue of
their attorney's actions had Defendna ts elected to accept the demand, but rather
whether the demand for a special shareholders' meeting met the detailed yet
unambiguous requirements of the statute, which the trial court correctly
concluded was not the case. The shareholder demand was not something that
statutorily could be delegated to an attorney, and thus it was deficient and did
. . ;)

not need to be accepted by Defendants. 27
Alternatively, even if the trial court somehow erred in concluding that
Plaintiffs' demand was not proper due to failure to comply with the statute, such

27

Defendants asserted the deficiency in the notice in June 2011 (R. at 70-99).
Plaintiffs could have easily corrected the error by sending a new demand that
was signed directly by Plaintiffs. They did not.
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conclusion was harmless error given that the court determined that a
shareholders' meeting should in fact be held. The court ordered:
An annual meeting of the Company's shareholders shall
be called by Defendants, and such meeting shall be held
within the next seventy-five (75) days. The date, time,
location, . and agenda for this meeting shall be
established by Defendants, and the meeting shall be
noticed by Sylvia, as the Company's secretary, in
accordance with the requirements of Utah law. Votes at
the meeting shall be taken in accordance with the
shareholder percentages set forth in paragraph 1, above.
(Order and Judgment

,r 3, App'x

A hereto.) The Company held the meeting as

ordered by the trial court on January 17, 2014 (though Plaintiffs declined to
attend (R. at 1488). Thus, the trial court's conclusion that the 2011 Demand did
not comply with the requirements of Utah statute did not impact the ultimate
outcome of the proceedings on that question because the court ordered a meeting
to be held, and a meeting was in fact held. 28 In re A.M., 2009 UT App 118,

,r 21,

208 P.3d 1058 ("Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that
there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings."
(quotations omitted)). The trial court's decision should therefore be upheld.

28

Plaintiffs have alleged no harm as a result of the delay in the meeting. And
any harm that could be alleged was caused by Plaintiff. See supra note 27.
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V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO
AWARD COSTS FOR MEDIATION.

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in awarding $1,072.50 in
mediation costs to Defendants because costs for mediation were not expressly
authorized by statute. The trial court awarded these mediation costs after noting,
however, that "Plaintiffs did not make any objection as to the mediation fees, and
they therefore shall be awarded." (Mem. Decision Regarding Defendants' Mem.
of Costs, and Plaintiffs' Mot. for Clarification and Stay at 3, R. 1519, attached
...J

hereto as App' x B). Because Plaintiffs did not object to Defendants' request for
mediation fees in the trial court, they failed to preserve the issue and this Court
should not consider it on appeal. Brady, 2013 UT App 97,

,r 38.

Even if this Court decides to consider this issue, it should determine that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding mediation costs. Rule
54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "costs shall be allowable as
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." The Utah
Supreme Court "has taken the position that the trial court can exercise
reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance of costs" while exercising a
"duty to guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof." Hatanaka v.
Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Frampton v. Wilson, 605

P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah 1980)).
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Although there is no statute specifically allowing a prevailing party to
recover its mediation expenses as a recoverable cost under Rule 54(d), the trial
court in this case correctly noted that it had discretion to allow the recovery of
such costs. See Mem. Decision Regarding Defendants' Mem. of Costs, and
Plaintiffs' Motion for Clarification and Stay ("Decision"), App' x B hereto, at 2.
In its Decision, the trial court cited Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999
UT App 80, 977 P.2d 508, which held:
Defendant has failed to present any evidence
persuading us that the trial court abused its discretion
in awarding mediation expenses to plaintiff. At most,
defendant argues that the court erred in awarding
mediation expenses because such expenses are not
statutorily authorized costs. This argument misses the
mark. In many cases we have allowed the taxing of.
costs despite the fact that no statute specifically
authorized such costs (e.g. deposition costs). . . .
Because defendant has not convinced us that the
expenses incurred during mediation were unreasonable
or were not 'necessarily incurred' ... we hold that the
court did not exceed its permitted range of discretion in
making such an award.

Id.

,r 39. The Stevenett court reasoned that it is good public policy to "encourage

exploitation of alternative dispute resolution methods by allowing the prevailing
party to recover costs so incurred." Id.

,r 38 (citing cases outside Utah allowing

awards of mediation costs); see also Long v. Stutesman, 2011 UT App 438,

,r 31,269

P.3d 178 (declining to address a trial court's award of costs for mediation in light
of inadequate briefing on why an award of costs for mediation was
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inappropriate). If the Court determines to consider this issue, it should hold that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the mediation costs. 29
CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellees respectfully request that the
trial court's decision be affirmed in all respects.
DATED this 9th day of January, 2015.

Nicole G. Farrel
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants

,-:\
1,/jJ}

29

Defendants asserted below that the mediation costs were appropriately
awarded as a sanction for Plaintiffs' failure to participate in the court ordered
mediation in good faith. (R. at 1434-1439). This provides an alternative basis for
affirmance on appeal. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, if 20 ("[A]n appellate court
may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground
or theory apparent on the record.").
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